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The USCCB and Rape Protocols 
by 
Peter J. Cataldo, Ph.D. 
The author is Director of Research, National Catholic Bioethics Center, 
Boston, MA. Thefollowing is reprintedfrom Ethics & Medics, Volume 29, 
No.4, April, 2004. 
Mter a review of the moral and scientific literature, and a consultation with 
physicians, theologians, and ethicists on the question of "emergency 
contraception" in rape protocols, the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops' Committee on Doctrine recently concluded in part that rape 
treatment protocols that only provide pregnancy testing prior to 
administering postcoital anovulatory drugs do not violate Directive 36 of 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. I 
The central reason for this conclusion is that it is uncertain whether these 
drugs in addition to suppressing ovulation might prevent pregnancy by a 
prefertilization, contraceptive effect, or by a post-fertilization, abortifacient 
effect.2 I submit that the committee's reason and conclusion rest on two 
erroneous assumptions. The first is that the purpose for testing the 
woman's ovulation phase is to ascertain the possibility of oonception.3 The 
second assumption, related to the first and critical to the argument for 
pregnancy-only testing, is that the prevention of fertilization includes 
destruction of a bound oocyte and spermatozoon at any point prior to 
formation of the zygote (prefertilization, contraceptive effect).4 These 
assumptions are problematic and require examination in order to assess 
whether ovulation phase testing is morally obligated according to Directive 
36. The pertinent portion of Directive 36 for the issue oftesting as it relates 
to the use of hormonal anovulatory drugs is the following: 
A female who has been raped should be able to defend 
herself against a potential conception from the sexual 
assault. If, after appropriate testing, there is no evidence that 
conception has occurred already, she may be treated with 
medications that would prevent ovulation, sperm 
capacitation, or fertilization. 
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Pregnancy-Only Testing 
Some advocates of pregnancy-only testing appear to misconstrue the 
focus of the preventative measures mentioned in Directive 36 to be on 
conception (formation of a zygote), both in terms of the purpose of 
ovulation phase testing and the meaning of preventing fertilization . Two 
inferences may be drawn if conception is the single standard by which 
preventative measures are to be understood: a) ovulation phase testing is 
interpreted as an ineffective attempt to determine possible conception, 
because conception cannot be determined from that test; and b) actions that 
intervene up to the point of conception are morally permissible. Knowing 
whether an oocyte could be present at the time of administering the 
medications has no moral relevance because, according to the pregnancy-
only testing view, there is no demonstrable evidence that they cause an 
abOltifacient effect ; and, more importantly, these medications could 
possibly act to prevent fertilization by "disrupting the fertilization 
process."5 However, the purpose of ovulation phase testing is not to 
determine a possible conception but to determine whether the drug is more 
likely to suppress ovulation and thereby prevent an oocyte from being 
available for fusion with a spermatozoon. In this way knowledge about the 
suppression of ovulation is also directly related to any attempt to prevent 
fertilization after ovulation. 
Preventing Fertilization 
Fertilization is inclusive of the many integral biological steps that 
occur from the binding of an oocyte and a spermatozoon up to and 
including the formation of a zygote.6 Recent Catholic teaching recognizes 
this scientific fact. 7 The fact that fertilization might not be complete until 
the formation of a zygote should not be relevant to what Directive 36 
counts as the prevention of fertilization. This completion point is not what 
Directive 36 states may be prevented by medications in cases of rape. The 
directive states that "she may be treated with medications that would 
prevent ovulation, spenn capacitation, or fertilization ." It does not state 
medications are permitted that prevent the "completion of fertilization after 
the process has begun." To prevent fertilization is to prevent the process 
from ever beginning, whether that process is defined as inclusive of, and 
completed by, the formation of the zygote or not.8 Thus, medications that 
act on an oocyte and a spermatozoon bound or fused together up to the 
moment of syngamy (fusion of the two pronuclei), would not count as 
preventing fertilization but as interfereing with it and should not be allowed 
according to Directive 36. 
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Self-Defense and Ovulation Phase Testing 
The intent of the statement in Directive 36 regarding preventative 
medications is to allow only those medications that will prevent male and 
female gametes from initially interacting as a matter of self-defense. This 
includes 1) preventing the release of an oocyte, 2) preventing the ability of 
spermatozoa from reaching an oocyte, and 3) preventing the binding of an 
oocyte with a spermatozoon through either 1) or 2). These are all truly self-
defensive measures because they are aimed at thwarting the action of the 
attacker's sperm as a lingering effect of the attack, not at destroying an 
entity (the bound oocyte and spermatozoon) which exists independently 
and is neither a cell of the attacker nor of the woman. By taking these 
measures, the woman is defending her fertility, her oocyte, from being 
joined with the attacker's germ cell. Consistent with self-defense, ovulation 
phase testing helps to ensure actions that will suppress ovulation to prevent 
the interaction of gametes, not to intervene after the fertilization process 
has begun but has not yet resulted in a zygote. Directive 36 was in part 
designed to allow morally certain self-defensive measures against the 
unjust meeting of gametes, not to accommodate evety request for postcoital 
hormonal drugs short of RU-486, as tragic as the circumstances may be.9 
Moral Certitude 
Given that the self-defensive actions of using medications are aimed 
at, and are morally justified on the basis of, preventing the gametes from 
meeting, Directive 36 presumes that this result is known with a moral 
certitude when the drugs are used. Moral certitude is the absence of 
prudent fear of erring in a practical judgment that inchtdes indecisive 
reasons contrary to the judgment. This is not absolute, one hundred percent 
certitude, as may be possible in the natural or empirical sciences, and is not 
required in matters of human action. However, to argue that this general 
standard is alone sufficient for assessing the issue of postcoital hormonal 
rape treatment, and that this standard is essentially different than some of 
the casuist systems for determining moral certitude, is question-begging. 10 
The general principle regarding certitude appropriate to the subject matter 
is the conceptual justification for the use of moral certitude. The casuist 
systems were applications of this general principle (albeit flawed in some 
cases), and as such there is no essential difference between the two. 
The Catholic moral tradition on moral certitude also required the 
safer course of action in cases involving matters of great value such as 
putting innocent human life at significant risk. It should be clear that this 
requirement does not presume knowledge of actual human life at risk, but 
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knowledge either of evidence pointing to a possible human being (e.g., the 
hunter aiming at an object behind a bush) or of something that could harm 
a human being actually known to exist (e.g., a person about to drink a 
suspicious beverage). J J However, the safer-course requirement is not 
applicable in the use of anovulatory hormonal agents because there is no 
conclusive evidence pointing to the existence of a possible human 
individual who might be harmed at the time that the drugs are given. This 
fact does not help the pregnancy-only-testing position because, irrespective 
of the lack of evidence for a human individual, destroying the bound 
spermatozoon and oocyte prior to syngamy cannot count as prevention of 
fertilization in the 20-30 percent of cases in which suppression of ovulation 
might fail, and about which the actual mechanism of action is uncertain. 
To conclude that administering only a pregnancy test does not violate 
Directive 36 is to conclude that ovulation-phase testing is not obligated by 
the directive. However, this second conclusion rests on the erroneous 
assumption that preventing fertilization includes something other than 
preventing the gametes from ever interacting as a matter of self-defense. 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the conclusion of the Committee on 
Doctrine should be reconsidered, and, it seems, a clarification of the text of 
Directive 36 by the bishops would be warranted as well. 
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